Scaling Back the ADA: How the Sutton v. United Air Lines Decision Affects Employees with Bipolar Disorder (Comment) by Kevin S. Wiley Jr.
SCALING BACK THE ADA: HOW THE SUTTON V. UNITED AIR
LINES DECISION AFFECTS EMPLOYEES WITH
BIPOLAR DISORDER
KEVIN S. WILEY, JR.*
I. The Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. Opinion ............... 367
A. Factual Background and Holding ...................... 367
B. Issues Resolved ....................................... 367
II. Impact of the Sutton Decision on Bipolar Disorder ....... 369
A. Scaling Back the ADA ................................ 369
B. Bipolar Disorder Under the Guise of Sutton .......... 371
C. Social Aspects of Scaling Back the ADA .............. 373
III. Sutton's Impact on the ADA .............................. 375
A. ADA Parameters: Defining What is Disabled ......... 375
B. Legislative Intent ..................................... 377
C. EEOC Guidelines ..................................... 380
IV. Proving Up the Disability ................................. 383
A. Threshold Analysis .................................... 383
B. Sutton's Treatment of the "Actual Disability" Prong .. 386
C. Sutton's Treatment of the "Record Of" Prong ......... 388
D. Sutton's Treatment of the "Regarded As" Prong ...... 388
V. Balancing Tensions ........................................ 390
VI. Recommendation ......................................... 392
* I would like to take this opportunity to thank the people who helped me with this
endeavor. To the team members of The Scholar, thank you for all of your technical
assistance and support. To Emma Guzmdn and Julie Linares, thank you for giving me
structure while allowing me to remain creative. To Professors Placido G6mez and Andre
Hampton, thank you for being my role models and teaching me to keep my eyes on the
prize. To LaTonya Davis and Terry Davis, thank you both for being such inspirations and
teaching me what a law student should be. To Margaret DeBruyn, thank you for showing
me courage and dedicatioin throughout my legal education. To Vitra Crenshaw-Monday,
thank you for your support and analytical input on this comment. And to Keisha David,
thank you for being my guardian angel through the maze of legal scholarship. This
comment is dedicated to all those suffering in silence with mental illness.
355
THE SCHOLAR
Six years ago Matthew Hendrix' was hired as a junior associate from
law school. Matthew, now an associate for one of the largest firms in the
world, was given the usual package for top graduates in the field of trans-
actional law. He procured a six figure salary. Law school and undergrad-
uate loans were partially paid off through a lucrative signing bonus, and
he was assured the usual incentives of medical and retirement benefits.
In exchange for the perks, Matthew was required to work nights, holi-
days, and weekends. The pressure to compete with the other associates
on the partnership track always loomed. In all, he would have to work
twice as hard now as he did when he graduated in the top two percent of
his class.
Six years passed, and everything in Matthew's life appeared to be per-
fect. He worked hard and attained the status of senior associate. Even
outside the legal world, Matthew gained respect through his dedication to
the legal aid clinic. With six years experience under his belt, he was
clearly becoming well-known as one of the up and coming attorneys in
the community. It appeared Matthew was well on his way to becoming
partner of this particular firm.
Yet, secretly, despite the perfection in his work and the respect he re-
ceived from the community, Matthew's biggest sense of accomplishment
was his ability to fool everyone. Indeed, he had fooled his friends, his
colleagues, and his employers. He had fooled everyone who believed he
lived a normal existence.
The accumulation of wealth and success did not come easy for Mat-
thew. However, nothing compared to the fact that Matthew continued to
survive his illness, an illness known as bipolar disorder.2
Looking back a decade ago, Matthew was close to annihilation from
the illness that encompassed his entire existence. Bipolar was not only a
1. Mathew Hendrix is a fictional name and his character is a compilation of different
people interviewed for this comment. Their accounts of dealing with employers and their
illness are the essential components of the hypothetical.
2. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-IV: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 350-58 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVJ (identi-
fying the mood disorder specified as bipolar disorder). Bipolar disorder is characterized by
major depressive episodes followed by or occurring prior to major manic episodes. See id.
at 355. The disorder is distinguished by severity into three categories of which Bipolar One
is the most severe specifier and the cyclothomic is the least severe. See id. at 350-53. Se-
verity is based in the occurrence of mood swings or mixed episodes. See id. at 351-53;
DAVID J. MILKOWITZ & MICHAEL J. GOLDSTEIN, BIPOLAR DISORDER: A FAMILY-Fo-
CUSED TREATMENT APPROACH 126 (1997) (explaining the role of biological imbalances in
the brain). Bipolar disorder is a chemical imbalance affecting the neural transmitters in the
brain. See id. The chemical imbalance creates the rapid triggering or inhibition of neuro-
transmitters. See id. The rapid triggering stimulates symptoms of mania or upward cycling,
while the inhibition of the transmitters causes depression or downward cycling. See id.
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monster for him to deal with, but for others as well.' Relationships with
his teachers and friends were strained due to his erratic behavior.4 His
family either demanded control of his illness, or felt too ashamed to ac-
knowledge that the illness even existed. At certain times in his life, Mat-
thew's solitude with the illness almost pushed him to the brink of suicide.
After a string of psychologists, psychiatrists, specialists, group thera-
pies, and an entire array of side effects from various medications, Mat-
thew finally found the relief he needed.' This relief came in the form of a
miracle drug called neurontin.6
Neurontin eventually brought balance into Matthew's life. It brought a
sense of peace out of the chaos of cycling from maniacal rage to despotic
melancholy.7 It brought him out of his dark past and into a brighter
future.
3. See generally DR. KAY R. JAMISON, AN UNoUIETr MIND 68 (1995) (suggesting that
bipolar disorder may cause inter-personal relationship problems). Dr. Jamison was a pro-
fessor at the UCLA School of Psychiatry. See id. at 4. She also suffers from Bipolar disor-
der and has written several books and essays on the subject. See id. at 5-8. AN UNOtIE
MIND is her autobiographical account of how she lives with this illness and how it may have
disastrous effects on marriage, family, and careers. See id.; Cory SerVaas. The Post Investi-
gates Manic-Depression, SATURDAY EVENING POST, March/Apr. 1996 (reporting that Dr.
Jamison is now a professor of a psychology at Johns Hopkins).
4. See Chatroom Interview with Bipolar Patients (Jan. 7, 2000) (on file with The
Scholar: St Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues) [hereinafter Bipolar Patients Inter-
view] (relating that the illness affects peers as well as family). Six people with bipolar
disorder were interviewed telephonically for this comment. Despite answering candidly to
questions related to family and employment relationships in the context of their bipolar
illness, their names shall remain anonymous. This cross section in no way should be inter-
preted as a statistical account of bipolar illness. Instead, their comments will be utilized to
gain a generalized appreciation of the debilitating affects of the disorder.
5. See DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 354 (suggesting that in order to identify the disorder,
the patient may need a battery of tests for a correct diagnosis); see also 3 AMERICAN PSY.
CHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: A TASK FORCE RE-
PORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION [hereinafter TREArMENTS] (listing
the tests to diagnose bipolar disorder to include: physical examination, psychoanalysis, and
family medical history).
6. See MnKLowIrz & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 132 (noting that neurontin is a drug
used as a mood stabilizer to regulate upward and downward cycling). The generic name of
neurontin is gabapentin. See id.; DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 350-51 (providing that a diagno-
sis of bipolar disorder will need to be differentiated from substance induced mood disor-
ders with proper medication). See generally FRANK J. AYD, LEXICON Or PSYCHIATRY,
NEUREOLOGY, AND NEUROSCIENCEs 293 (1995). Gabapentin has been marketed for the
treatment of adults with epilepsy or refractory partial seizures. See id. However. the
GABA receptor has been classified to treat mental illness by increasing amino acid neuro-
transmitter inhibitors in the central nervous system.
7. See DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 350-51 (stating that the severity of bipolar illness is
distinguished through diagnosis). Patients diagnosed with Bipolar I, the most severe speci-
fier, experience severe states of mania then severe states of depression over shorter cyclical
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The neurontin essentially placed the major symptoms of the disorder
into remission, thus diminishing the days of loosing sleep for three or four
days straight, or crying uncontrollably in his apartment for hours with
thoughts of committing suicide.' He no longer placed fear in the minds of
his friends and his family that really never understood his condition, nor
attempted to understand what he endured on a daily basis.9
Also in the past were the side effects that took control of his life as
severely as the illness itself. After an initial diagnosis, the doctors could
only experiment with different drugs. The experimentation certainly
qualified as a trial and error experience. However, for each error, there
was a price to pay in the form of a side effect. The primary drug of choice
at that time was lithium.' ° With the lithium came the weight gain, leth-
argy and tremors." The next drug in this cycle of trial and error was
depakote.12 The depakote not only caused more side effects; it tended to
phases. See id. at 352. Where least severe bipolars may experience four episodes over a
ten year span, rapid cyclers experience mixed states of hypomania, psychotic, or depressive
states within a year. See id. at 353.
8. See id. at 353 (detailing that the melancholic effects of bipolar disorder may cause
the patient to commit suicide). Completed suicide occurs in ten to fifteen percent of Bipo-
lar I patients. See id. See also MiKLow-rz & GOLDSTMIN, supra note 2, at 20-21 (1997)
(delineating some of the behavioral patterns associated with bipolar disorder). An upward
cycle may last for several hours, days, or months depending on the severity of the illness.
See id. at 23-24. The physical symptoms can look like quick speech patterns, rapid body
movement, or constant frenetic activity. See id. at 21-20; JAMISON, supra note 3, at 68
(describing the mood swings of bipolar illness from wild, impulsive, chaotic, and energetic
replaced by irritable, withdrawn, and suicidal).
9. See generally R. JULIAN HAFNER, MARRIAGE AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A SEx-ROLES
PERSPECTIVE 149-51 (1986) (suggesting that bipolar disorder will often cause familial
problems); MIKLOWrrZ & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 151. Families will tend to go
through a state of denial concerning the illness. See MIKLowrrz & GOLDSTEIN, supra note
2, at 151. The denial can therefore create a schism between the patient and spouse or
family member. See id. at 152. Therapy is encouraged for spouses of the bipolar patient as
well. See HAFNER, supra at 151.
10. See also TREATMENTS, supra note 5, at 1925-26 (3d ed. 1989) (suggesting that lith-
ium is one of the first drugs used to identify and diagnose bipolar disorder); Internet
Mental Health, Lithium Carbonate, (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http:/lwww.mentalhealth.com/
drug/p30-102.html> [hereinafter Lithium Carbonate]. The chemical matrix of lithium is
similar to that of sodium and somehow alleviates some of the symptoms caused by the
illness. See id.; MIKLOwrZ & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 131 (providing how medica-
tions work to alleviate the symptoms of mental illness).
11. See TREATMENTS, supra note 5, at 1930 (acknowledging the side effects associated
with lithium). Other side effects associated with lithium. See also Lithium Carbonate,
supra note 10 (noting that the adverse effects of lithium may include gastrointestinal dis-
comfort, nausea, vertigo, muscle weakness, fatigue, and constant thirst).
12. See MiKLowrrz & GOLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 132 (ascribing depakote as a mood
stabilizer to regulate upward and downward cycling). See also Internet Mental Health,
Valproic Acid, (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.mentalhealth.com/drug/p-30-d)2.html>
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exacerbate the illness. Whereas the lithium created an apathetic zombie,
the depakote elevated Matthew's depression to a level of suicidal ten-
dency. Other drugs with varying levels of ingestion retained the physical
affects of nausea, imbalance, and dry-mouth while also retaining the psy-
chological affects of paranoia and nervousness.' 3
At the end of it all, Matthew was finally prescribed neurontin.'t This
drug seemed to do what all the others could not. The neurontin finally
stopped all the maniacal rage and sadness. He no longer felt the compul-
sive need to spend money or the euphoria of saying and doing whatever
he desired no matter the outcome. 5 He no longer felt sick."6 He was
finally "normal."17
Yet, in spite of the success of his job and the success of his new drug,
Matthew's biggest accomplishment was that no one knew about the ill-
ness. Although disclosure of his condition was mandatory to the Board
of Law Examiners, their confidentiality assured Matthew of no inhibi-
tions to practice law, as long as he remained stable. Setbacks and flare-
[hereinafter Valproic Acid] (listing the affects of Valproic Acid). Depakote. usually associ-
ated as an anticonvulsant drug, is the brand name associated with valporic acid. See id.
Adverse effects may include depression, psychosis. aggression, hyperactivity, and behav-
ioral deterioration. See id.
13. See MiLKowrrz & GoLDSrEIN, supra note 2. at 178 (describing the varying side
effects of drugs to alleviate bipolar disorder): see also Bipolar Patients Interview, supra
note 4 (suggesting that the drugs ingested heightened moods and paranoia and
nervousness).
14. See MIKLOWrrz & GO.DSTEIN, supra note 2, at 132 (Itsting neurontin as one of
many mood stabilizers to regulate upward and downward cycling).
15. See JAMISON, supra note 3, at 68 (describing that one of the sensations of bipolar
disorder is that of "financial omnipotence"); 1 ADA P. KAHN & JAN FAvCEITr, ENC'-Y(LO-
PEDIA of MENTAL HEALTH 75 (1998) (validating that bipolars may incorporate inappropri-
ate degrees of self-confidence, have little need for sleep, and impulse behavior such as
excessive shopping and spending): Bipolar Patients Interview, supra note 4 (describing a
situation in which one patient admitted to spending three months worth of rent money and
almost facing eviction).
16. See JAMISON, supra note 3. at 101-04 (recounting that bipolars may feel cured or
impervious to their condition if their medication is working), For many bipolars who feel
chained to their medications, the improvement of their mental stability justifies coming off
the medication. See id. at 103. Such self-diagnosis may lead to relapse to the patient's
rapid cycling as it did for Dr. Jamison on several occasions. See id. at 105.
17. See generally Bipolar Patients Interview, supra note 4. It should not be assumed
that people with bipolar disorder are abnormal. Millions suffer from bipolar disorder, yet
live what may be perceived, by the general public, ordinary lives. See id. However, it
should be acknowledged that severe effects of bipolar disorder limit the "normal" func-
tions of everyday living. See id. The patients interviewed for this comment described a
desire to live without the constant effects of their illness or what they described as living
"normally." See id.
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ups from the illness still occurred from time to time. 8 During these infre-
quent episodes, Matthew would either take a few days from work or fight
through his condition.' 9 Because Matthew had concealed the bipolar dis-
order so well, no one bothered to ask why he would snap at support staff
or appear tired during the day. Everyone considered Matthew's attitude
the simple side effect of practicing law. In most cases, due to the neuron-
tin, these were just the effects of a stressful practice of law. However, any
number of things could still trigger the illness.2" The reality was, Mat-
thew could never really be "normal."21
After six years of concealing his illness, the issue of his condition finally
surfaced. The new office manager, in charge of contracting with the local
medical care facilitator, inquired as to why Matthew's medications were
so expensive. 2 Although he was not legally obligated to disclose why the
cost of his benefits was so high, as compared to the other associates, Mat-
thew felt comfortable with providing this information. In fact, disclosure
would finally come as a relief. During these six years, many of his co-
workers became not only mentors, but trustworthy friends as well. With-
out the pressure to continue his charade, he candidly responded to the
manager's inquiry.
As with any corporate setting, the firm had a grapevine that spread
from the lowest mail clerk to the highest partner. The partners in charge
of the local office had limited knowledge of bipolar disorder. Their
awareness stemmed from family members or friends who were diagnosed
with the condition.
In an unofficial meeting of the partners, Matthew's bipolar illness was
discussed. Several of the partners felt threatened by potential issues that
may arise due to the fact that one of their associates practices law with a
18. See generally MIKLOwrrz & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 142 (noting that drugs
which offer a solution for bipolar disorder may still be limited by the conduct of the
patient).
19. See JAMISON, supra note 3, at 113 (suggesting that bipolars stop working when
they do not take the medication).
20. See MIKLowITz & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 278-80 (delineating that alcohol
usage, drug usage, and stress may be conducive to elevate manic symptoms).
21. See JAMISON, supra note 3, at 88-89 (projecting that despite the curative value of
medication, one should still seek therapy because pills alone cannot "ineffably heal");
MiLKowrz & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 133 (denoting the importance of psychological
treatment). The suggestion here is that beyond the pharmacological treatments, a patient
may need therapy to cope with the stress and pressure of the illness. See id.
22. See 9 MENTAL HEALTH DISORDER SOURCE BOOK 219 (Karen Belliner ed., 9th
ed., 1996) [hereinafter SOURCE BooK](intimating that the costs of having bipolar disorder
may be severe both emotionally and financially); see also Bipolar Patients Interview, supra
note 4 (showing that the medication costs range from four hundred to over three thousand
dollars a year).
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serious psychological disorder. At its conclusion, the bottom line of the
meeting turned to the bottom line of the firm. Matthew Hendrix would
not make partner; moreover, he should be let go from the firm.
Within the next few weeks, the star associate noticed that his col-
leagues no longer invited him to lunch. His tasks and assignments were
simplified, and even the support staff shied away from working on his
projects. After someone told him that the strange conduct was due to the
awareness of his illness, and that he should fear for his job, Matthew de-
cided to become more proactive.
Matthew went to the partners, officially disclosed his condition in a
memo and asked for 'reasonable accommodations.'" The reasonable ac-
commodations requested were to be in the form of excused absences. 24
The firm could then reimburse the excused absences from paid vacation
leave.25
In response to the memo, the firm denied Matthew's request for ex-
tended excused absences. Attached to the response was a memo from
the employment section of the firm detailing how under the legal analysis
of the recent Supreme Court decision handed down in Sutton v. United
Air Lines,26 he would not be considered disabled. Moreover, due to Mat-
thew's outstanding record, as an employee, and his ability to stabilize his
condition, the firm would not consider Matthew as having a disability.
Ironically, a few months following this exchange, Matthew was told that
due to impending financial considerations, the firm no longer needed his
services.
Immediately after his termination, Matthew filed suit against the firm
for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).-"
23. See 29 C.F.R. app §1630.2(o)(ii) (1998) (defining accommodation for the purposes
of the ADA). "[A]n accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way
things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal em-
ployment opportunities." Id. See also Karen Dill Danforth, Reading Reasonableness Out
of the ADA: Responding to Threats by Employees with Mental Illness Following Palmer, 85
VA. L. REv. 661, 669 (1999) (acknowledging that the EEOC has defined
"accommodation").
24. See generally Bultmeyer v. Ft. Wayne Comm. Schools, 100 F. 3d 1281 (1996) (ex-
emplifying the need for reasonable accommodations in disability discrimination cases in-
volving mental illness).
25. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (o) (1998).
26. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
27. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, and 12182
(1994) (prohibiting disability-based discrimination with respect to employment, public
services and public accommodations).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) General Rule:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring. advancement, or
2000]
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Matthew's attorneys, however, explained that the chances of recovery are
limited because he has remained stable for the last six years under his
medication. In essence, the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton may al-
low the Courts to disregard his claim.28
In a state of confusion, anger, and frustration, Matthew understood
that there may be little hope for people who spend their lives becoming
healthy only to face discrimination based on the appearance of health.
The ADA, which purports to protect those with disabilities from discrimi-
nation, has ultimately failed Matthew and the millions of others suffering
with bipolar disorder.
The story you have just read is a hypothetical situation. Yet, under the
recent Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.29 opinion, the above scenario could
not be more real. Employees with bipolar disorder work under a hypo-
critical system that does not acknowledge the realities of mental disabili-
ties.3° The hypocrisy is such that our judicial system forces bipolars to
disclose their condition to employers without providing adequate protec-
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12132 Discrimination:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by any reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) General Rule:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoymen of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases, (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
28. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151 (arguing that the "substantially limited" analysis,
proffered by the court, would limit situations in which a plaintiff may bring a disability
claim). The argument suggests that if the impairment does not presently substantially limit
the plaintiff in a major life activity, the claim is invalid. See id. Ron Honberg, Supreme
Court Decisions Could Limit ADA Protections, 1 NAT'L ALLIANcE FOR THE MENrALLY
ILL (visited on Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.nami.org/legal/990828d.html> (asserting that
the Supreme Court decisions of Sutton and Murphy have narrowed the definition of disa-
bility). "Though none of the petitioners suffered from a mental disability, the rulings in
Sutton and Murphy could prove to be particularly problematic for people with mental ill-
ness or other conditions which are episodic in nature and characterized by frequent fluctu-
ations in severity of symptoms." Id.
29. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
30. See Peggy R. Mastrioanni & Carol R. Miaskoff, Coverage of Psychiatric Disorders
Under the Americans with Disability Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 723 (1997) (illuminating that
disclosure of a mental illness may "provoke" the type of discrimination it is designed to
defeat).
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tion from the social stigma attached to the illness." Bipolar employees
now face the risk that a court may not consider the employee as having a
disability if that employee appears to be healthy if taking proper medica-
tion.32 Therefore, arguably, employers are free to discriminate against
the mentally disabled without repercussions from the legal system.33
I selected bipolar disorder for this comment because it exemplifies the
potential for disregarding someone's case based on the appearance of
that individual. Bipolar disorder, or what is commonly known as manic/
depression, is a psychological disorder affecting a large segment of the
nation's populace.' 4 It is defined as a genetic condition that creates
chemical imbalances, distorting both moods and personalities.35 The ill-
ness may manifest itself in many ways, such as severe mania, depression,
psychotic behavior, paranoia, and suicide.3 6
The recognition and advancements towards a cure for bipolar disorder
are positive for employees suffering from the illness.37 However, because
31. See ROBIN M. KOWALSKI ET AL., THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONAL AND
BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 225 (1999) (finding that people with mental illness often feel
trapped when confronted with whether they should disclose their condition to friends or
employers). See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (1999).
According to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A):
States that discrimination includes not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disa-
bility who is an applicant of employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity.
Id. Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of North Carolina, 859 F. Supp. 963, 966
(E.D.N.C. 1994) (exemplifying that the ADA requires an employer to make reasonable
accommodations for individuals qualified to perform the essential elements of their job).
32. See generally Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149 (noting that the ADA protects "only those
whose impairments are not covered by corrective measures").
33. See id. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting "fully cured impairments are
covered, but merely treatable ones are not").
34. See SOURcE BOOK, supra note 22, at 219 (quoting statistical information from the
National Health Institute). Bipolar Disorder inflicts over 2.3 million in the United States.
See id.
35. See KAHN & FAWCETr, supra note 15, at 75.
36. See DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 353 (providing the symptoms associated with bipolar
disorder).
37. See TREATmEmrs, supra note 5. at 1925 (proposing that recent advances in science
have led to a greater recognition of bipolar illness). See also National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, NAMI Presents 10-Year Forecast of Mental Health Trends, (visited Mar. 13,
2000) <http://www.nami.org/pressroom/000223.html> [hereinafter NAMI] (acknowledging
the positive forecasts for mental health care). This press release includes the remarks of
Laurie Flynn, executive director of National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI). See id.
Her assessment details that with "sophisticated electronic imaging techniques that allow
researchers to see in the living brain, scientists can discern areas of the brain that malfunc-
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one may not outwardly appear to have a mental illness, it would be easy
to disregard the condition, and therefore, disregard one's case for dis-
crimination.38 There may be prevalent side effects due to the illness, and
as the hypothetical situation described, the illness itself may prevent one
from working at their full capacity.39 In effect, this creates the duality
that bipolars must live and work under. Further, the social stigma at-
tached to the illness, regardless of the good health exhibited by the em-
ployee, nurtures a discriminatory environment.4 °
The purpose of this comment is to delineate the parameters of the
ADA under the guise of Sutton and to recommend a resolution that
would provide a middle ground between lawsuit abuse and scaling back
the protections of the ADA to a bare minimum. Bipolar disorder, as dis-
cussed in this comment is the background through which the reader
should gain an understanding of how the Sutton decision went too far in
the Supreme Court's effort to scale back the ADA. It will also be the
example of how courts and legislators should modify the law to incorpo-
rate protections for those who have disabling conditions that are not
physically apparent.
In order to illustrate the parameters of the ADA, the comment will
look at the specific language of the statute. Within this specific language,
we learn how the courts define disability. When disability is defined, we
learn who falls under the umbrella of the ADA and how these individuals
tion during specific illnesses and soon may enable treatments to be targeted more effec-
tively." Id.; David Satcher, Mental Health: A Report from the Surgeon General, Preface to
the Surgeon General U.S. Public Health Service (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.
surgeongeneral.gov/library.mentalhealth/hom.html> (stating that the twentieth century has
observed advances in the improvement of the public health through both medical science
and innovative advances to health care services).
38. See Mastroianni & Miaskoff, supra note 30, at 726 (suggesting there are situations
where it is not clear whether an individual has a psychiatric disability to bring an ADA
claim); see also Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 798 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff's depression did not rise to the level of 'substantially limiting'
based on her ability to work).
39. See MIKLowrr-z & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 178 (noting that bipolars may
decide not to take medication due to the side affects); see also Bipolar Patients Interview,
supra note 2 (providing that these side effects may include weight gain, nausea, trembling,
sedation, abdominal pain, or temporal imbalance).
40. See Satcher, supra note 37. "The tragic and devastating disorders such as schizo-
phrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder... and a range of other mental disorders affect
nearly one in five Americans in any year, yet continue too frequently to be spoken of in
whispers and shame." Id. See generally JAMISON, supra note 3, at 7 (noting her concerns of
the repercussions of discussing her illness).
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are protected.41 By establishing who or what the ADA affects, one may
then appreciate how Sutton essentially shrinks this protection.
Next, this comment will also focus on how one proves up a case of
discrimination under the ADA. Within the language of the statute, there
are certain criteria to establish before one has standing.4 2 Generally,
these steps include proving that one indeed has a condition sufficiently
discernable for one to be judged as having a disability.43 Proving that one
qualifies as disabled is arguably the most critical stage in a disability
case.' For without such categorization, one does not have standing to
prove that the employer's conduct was unlawful.45
The parameters of the ADA and the literal meaning of the statute are
also discussed under the statute's legislative intent. One of the central
arguments pertaining to the definition of disability concerns the Congres-
sional intent of the ADA.' This issue sparked a level of controversy in
41. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). See
generally Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The American with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implica-
tions of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L L RE-v. 413, 415-26
(1991) (commenting in the origins and purposed of the ADA). Disabled persons in
America have been categorized as "uniquely unprivileged and disadvantaged." Id. at 415.
The ADA was essentially passed to protect the needs of these disadvantaged persons by
addressing discrimination practices of employment and facilitating their physical needs
with access to public buildings and other accommodations. See id. at 437-40.
42. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1994) (pro-
viding the statutory language needed to bring a case of discrimination based on disability).
This section of the ADA states: "[Tihe term 'discriminate' includes- limiting, segregating,
or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities
or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or em-
ployee .... Id.
43. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (1999) (provid-
ing the criteria which one must show for a case of discrimination due to disability). This
sections states:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having
such impairment.
Id.
44. See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the Disability Definition in the Americans with "Disabilities" Act of 1990,77 N.C.
L. REv. 1405, 1426-27 (1999) (concluding that the burden is on a plaintiff, under the ADA,
to prove they belong "in a class of people with disabilities").
45. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998). see also Eichhorn, supra note 44,
at 1408 (indicating that a plaintiff must make a prima facie case on an ADA discrimination
claim to survive summary judgment).
46. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1408 (suggesting that the issue of congressional
intent has been one of the most contested debates concerning ADA interpretation). Prob-
lematic statutory language is cited as a reason for such debates. See id.
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the lower courts that was ultimately recognized by the Supreme Court, in
Sutton.47
Following the legislative history of the ADA, the comment will focus
on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") inter-
pretive guidelines pertaining to how courts should define what is consid-
ered a disability.48 The EEOC was attempting to create an interpretive
guidance that would enable courts to clearly define the parameters of the
ADA.49 However, the lower courts have debated over whether the inter-
pretive guidelines merit deference to the EEOC. ° Sutton has ultimately
decided not to address this issue.51
Although the deference issue was ultimately ignored by the Supreme
Court, Justice O'Connor's language in Sutton cuts like a surgeon's scalpel
to scale back the protections of the ADA. One of the central issues of
this comment is the focus on Justice O'Connor's written opinion and her
utilization of the present indicative form to define the term "substantially
limited", thus contorting the meaning of a "disabling condition.""2 In
several respects, the narrowing of "the substantially limited" definition
quantifies how the court, in Sutton, has narrowed the purpose and intent
of the ADA.
The main part of this comment, however, focuses on how the limited
protections of the ADA are scaled down even further for bipolar employ-
ees under the judicial interpretation of Sutton. To gain an appreciation of
47. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999) (citing
the conflicting viewpoints or decisions in various circuits).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1998) (delineating the purpose, applicability, and imple-
mentation of the EEOC provisions of the ADA).
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999). This section states:
'Physical or mental impairment' means:
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproduc-
tive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or Any
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
50. Compare Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding that the EEOC's interpretation is not merely permissible; it is entirely consistent
with the ADA's legislative history and broad intent for a remedial statute), with Sutton, 130
F.3d at 902 (holding that the portion which directs courts to ignore mitigating measures is
in direct conflict with the ADA and is inconsistent internally with other portions of the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance).
51. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2141. The suggestion here is that by stating that deference
is a non-issue, the Supreme Court sought to finally qualify whether mitigating measures
should be utilized. The Court stated that "no agency has been delegated authority to inter-
pret the term 'disability' as it is used in the ADA." Id.
52. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
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how it feels to live with the illness, the comment will primarily discuss the
medical diagnostics of bipolar disorder. Along with these specific diag-
nostics, the comment will also shed light on the social stigma that is at-
tached to mental disabilities. Focusing on the physical, psychological, and
social aspects in mind, this comment will raise the utility of scaling back
the ADA.
Bipolar disorder, as viewed under Sutton, will be discussed first
through the language of the opinion and, secondly, through the discrimi-
nation that results from the social stigma attached to the disorder. In
conclusion, this comment will present a response to Justice O'Connor's
opinion and recommend an amendment to the ADA as a solution clearly
defining what should be considered a disability.
I. THE SUTrON V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. OPINION
A. Factual Background and Holding
Two severely myopic twin sisters applied for and were denied employ-
ment for a major commercial airline.53 Purportedly, the sisters' applica-
tions were denied because they did not meet the airline's minimum
requirement of visual acuity.54 In turn, the sisters filed suit against the
Airline under the ADA. The Supreme Court upheld the 10th Circuit
opinion acknowledging that the sisters' allegations were insufficient to
state a claim of discrimination.55 The majority opinion written by Justice
O'Connor held that because mitigating or corrective measures should be
considered when determining whether applicants are disabled, the appli-
cants were not disabled under the ADA.56
B. Issues Resolved
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines has dealt a
substantial blow to employees seeking protection under the ADA.5 7 The
purpose of the ADA was to protect the employees with disabilities in the
work place.58 However, in order to seek protection under the ADA, one
53. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2141 (1999).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 2146.
56. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139(1999).
57. The Court's decision in Sutton has dealt a blow to employee because it permits
employers to consider corrective or mitigating measures taken by an individual in deter-
mining if they are disabled. See id. at 2146.
58. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 (a),(b), 12112 (a)
(1994). Section 12112 states,
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
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must have a discernable disability.59 In essence, one's impairment must
either be diagnosed and disclosed to the employer, or the employer must
regard the employee as having a disability.6"
From the language of the ADA, one can also logically infer, that em-
ployees must provide notice to employers of their condition so that rea-
sonable accommodations when requested are implemented.6 1
Reasonable accommodation would be any element within the work place
to allow a qualified individual to sufficiently fulfill their tasks as an
employee.62
Examples of reasonable accommodations may seem commonplace in
today's workforce environment. 63 However, prior to the disability move-
ments of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which ultimately resulted in the
emergence of the ADA, the pressure and demand to accommodate the
disabled was not present.64 Without such a movement, employers and
society in general were free to continue to arbitrarily decide who was
disabled and worthy of accommodations, as opposed to those who should
have been able to perform "normally" in society.65
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
59. See Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act: A Search of the Meaning of "Disability", 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 590-91 (1998)
(showing the three tier prongs a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination based on a disability).
60. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)(a), (b) (1994);
see also Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1421-22 (suggesting that the ADA prohibits an em-
ployer's failure to make reasonable accommodations that would allow employees access to
full participation in the workplace).
61. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (describing the term discrimination to
include "not making reasonable accommodations to known physical or mental limita-
tion. . .") (emphasis added); see also Burgdorf, supra note 41, at 460-61.
62. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)(a)(b) (1994);
Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1421-22 (suggesting that the ADA prohibits an employer's
failure to utilize reasonable accommodations that would allow employees access to full
participation in the workplace).
63. Such accommodations since the inception of the ADA include physical re-
fabrication of buildings and accessibility to public walkways and entrances. See Burgdorf,
supra note 41, at 470-73 (addressing Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act dealing
with public accommodations). The commentator notes that Congress addressed concerns
of public accommodation by mandating that construction or alteration of facilities must
comply with accessibility requirements. See id.
64. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1409-15.
65. See id.
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II. IMPACT OF THE SUTTON DECISION ON BIPOLAR DISORDER
A. Scaling Back the ADA
In 1990, as he signed the ADA into law, President Bush announced
that the new legislation represented the "full flowering of our democratic
principles and promised to open up all aspects of American life to indi-
viduals with disabilities. 66 The ADA has arguably changed the status of
millions of Americans, enabling a formerly invisible section of society to
participate more fully in the nation's workforce.67 However, by 1996,
courts applying the language of the ADA had summarily dismissed nu-
merous cases of alleged disability discrimination on the ground that the
plaintiffs were not disabled.68 A survey by the American Bar Association
found that ninety-two percent of ADA discrimination claims were dis-
missed on summary judgment.69
Although the ADA has been hailed as a chief accomplishment of a civil
rights movement on behalf of persons with physical and mental disabili-
ties, the debate to define what a disability is has seriously undermined the
effectiveness of this legislation.7" Sutton, in response to this debate, has
whetted the blade fashioned by the circuit courts to surgically remove
many of the protections originally included within the ADA.7
This removal of original ADA protections begins with Justice
O'Connor's stance, that if individuals were reviewed in their unmitigated
state, the individualization of their inquiries would no longer take af-
fect.7 2 Instead, courts would lump impairments into classifications of dis-
ability, rather than evaluating each individual on a case by case basis.
The ideology of the ADA was meant to look at each individual case by
case.73 Even the EEOC in its interpretive guidelines addresses the fact
66. See id. at 1407.
67. See generally id. at 1409-11 (qualifying how the ADA has successfully emerged as
a product of the Civil Rights Movement).
68. See id. at 1477 n.171 (listing an ABA study which suggests defendants ,in 92% of
the time).
69. See id. at 1432.
70. See Catherine J. Lactot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Indi-
vidualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VitA.. L REv. 327,
327-28 (1997) (deliberating that the ADA's promise of an end to discrimination against
people with disabilities has yet to become a reality due in large part to judicial narrowing
of its provisions).
71. See Supreme Mischief, N.Y. TittEs, June 24. 1999, at A26 (suggesting that the Sut-
ton decision significantly weakens the ADA and ignores its intended purpose).
72. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999) (suggesting that
viewing persons in their unmitigated state contravenes the statutory intent of individual-
ized inquiry).
73. See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1999) (providing that -the determination of
whether an individual has a disability is based on the effect of that impairment on the life
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that employees seeking redress must have an individualized inquiry.74
The majority on the Supreme Court essentially feared that one may look
at different disabling conditions in their unmitigated state and potentially
classify various degrees of infirmities as simply "disabled".75 For exam-
ple, one may correlate the condition of myopia with blindness and deter-
mine that people wearing glasses with less than perfect vision should still
be considered disabled.76 Similarly, someone with a broken leg could be
synonymous with a paralyzed person.7 7
Yet, Justice O'Connor and the rest of the majority failed to recognize
that the door swings both ways when interpreting the severity of disabili-
ties.7 8 It is just as easy to label certain conditions as not being disabilities
if the employee is utilizing some ameliorative aid to alleviate their impair-
ment.79 Patients whose medications fail to reduce signs of their condition
may still face the possibility of limited or no coverage for their ADA
claims.8" As such, the fear of losing individualized inquiry by looking at
the mitigated status exists in the same category as looking at individuals
only in their unmitigated state.8 Both sides on this issue may be missing
of the individual"); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 634 (1998) (holding that Congress did
not intend to create per se disabilities under the ADA).
74. See 29 C.F.R. app § 1630.20) (1998) (establishing that disability claims should be
reviewed on a case by case basis).
75. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2147. "The agency guidelines' directive that persons be
judged in their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized
inquiry mandated by the ADA." Id.
76. See id. at 2144, 2147 (insinuating that looking at an impairment without regard to
mitigating measures would categorize certain conditions as per se disabilities).
77. See id. at 2146.
78. Determining whether an individual has a disability under the auspices of ameliora-
tive or mitigating factors diminishes the likelihood of finding a disability. Potentially, a
court may assume that the non-manifestation of an illness disqualifies a disability claim.
This is true especially for non-chronic or temporary illnesses such as severe migraines,
controlled diabetes, or controlled mood disorders. See generally Mastroianni & Miaskoff,
supra note 30, at 734 (sampling situations in which certain impairments may not rise to the
level of a disability for purposes of the ADA).
79. See, e.g., Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d 604, 611 (N.D.
Tex. 1999) (holding that plaintiff's condition did not rise to the level of disability for pur-
poses of the ADA because of his prescribed corrective measure).
80. See Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F.Supp.2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Rutlin v.
Prime Succession, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 735 (W.D. Mich. 1999); Robb v. Horizon Credit
Union, 66 F.Supp.2d 913 (C.D.Ill. 1999) (holding that plaintiff who suffered depression and
took medication for her illness was not "substantially limited" and thus not disabled under
the ADA); Francis v. Chemical Banking Corp., 62 F.Supp.2d 948 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding
that "thinking normally" and "socializing" are not major life activities, and thereby plain-
tiff was not disabled from his panic disorder).
81. Compare Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999) (supporting
review of disabilities with mitigating measures), with Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of
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the point of individualized inquiry by ignoring the true intent of the
ADA, which is looking at the severity of the employee's condition.'
B. Bipolar Disorder Under the Guise of Sutton
The Sutton opinion increases the potential likelihood of discrimination,
and an apparent example of this assertion can be found when one
presents the condition of bipolar disorder under the guise of the deci-
sion.'s It is likely Congress did not intend for the ADA to be expanded
to people with only slight impairments. The Court in Sutton feared that
the ADA would potentially reach 160 million people if it included a class
of people with slight impairments.' Yet, the language in Sutton which
specifically states that a disability "exists only where an impairment 'sub-
stantially limits', . . . not where it 'might', 'could', or 'would' [limit],"85
allows an employer to discriminate based the present health of an em-
ployee. Bipolars that are properly medicated would not have the mani-
festations needed to bring a claim of discrimination because they would
no longer be considered disabled." In fact, if an employee suffered from
a disability but exhibited no outward traits of their condition, as is often
the case for functioning bipolars,87 the employer has a green light to ad-
versely impact the terms of employment simply because the employee
seemed healthy.' 8
According to a Department of Labor study, approximately 13% of the
ADA charges filed with the EEOC were based on emotional or psychiat-
Texas, 152 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring review of disabilities with mitigating
measures only in the context of less severe conditions).
82. See generally Lauren J. McGarity, Note. Disabling Corrections and Correctable
Disabilities: Why Side Effects Might Be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALE L.J. 1161,
1175-78 (2000) (asserting that the protections of the ADA should focus on the -severity"
and "duration" of the impairment with or without regard to mitigating measures).
83. See Honberg, supra note 28 (suggesting that the Supreme Court decisions could
prove problematic for people with mental illness).
84. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2142.
85. 1& at 2141-42.
86. See generally Danforth. supra note 23, at 666 (noting that determination of what
constitutes a disability with regard to is especially difficult because a psychological impair-
ment may show no outward symptoms of the illness).
87. See Barriers to Employment for People with Disabilities: Hearings on Social Secur-
ity Before the Subcomn. on Social Security Commn. Of the Ways and Means House Comm.,
102 Cong. 62 (1999) (statement of Jim McNulty, National Alliance for the Mentally I11)
[hereinafter Barriers] (concluding that millions for people suffering from serious brain dis-
orders are able to work and be productive).
88. See generally Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to Be Crazy to Work Here": Worker
Stress, The Abusive Workplace, and Tie I of the ADA, 31 Loy. LA. L REv. 795, 802
(1998) (stating that despite ADA protections, the majority of claimants with mental disa-
bilities lose their discrimination cases).
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ric impairment between July 26, 1992, and September 30, 1998.89 These
impairments included anxiety disorders, depression, schizophrenia, and
bipolar disorder." For the fiscal year 1998, claims based on psychiatric or
emotional impairment amounted to approximately 16% of the charges
received, making this the fastest growing category of claims that year for
ADA claimants.91 Of the impairments most often filed, mental illness is
the fastest growing category of charges filed each year since the inception
of the ADA.92 The EEOC responded to the growing number of mental
illness claims by issuing enforcement guidelines in 1997 to facilitate the
full enforcement of the ADA.93 The guidelines provide several hypothet-
ical scenarios involving mentally ill employees clarifying the relevant pro-
visions of the ADA and suggest appropriate responses to these
situations.94
For claimants with bipolar disorder the threshold line of inquiry is a
two step process. First, determine whether the impairment at issue is a
disability under the statute.95 Second, if an impairment is found to be a
disability, determine whether the individual qualified for the position at
issue.96 In following the pattern of other ADA inquiries, the major point
of contention surrounds whether a particular psychiatric disorder consti-
tutes a disability. Prior to the Sutton decision, a majority of courts found
that individuals diagnosed as "seriously mentally ill" are disabled under
the ADA.97 However, Sutton blurs this concept of "seriously mentally
ill" patients receiving protected status, due to the physical appearance of
a healthy condition.98
In the advent of Sutton, there will be a significant impact upon employ-
ees with bipolar disorder if outward signs of their illness are not preva-
lent. Thus, employers that fear the effects of the disorder no longer have
89. See Danforth, supra note 23, at 673.
90. See id. at 663.
91. See id. at 673 & n.85 (stating the percentage of claims by the category of
claimants).
92. See id. at 673.
93. See id.
94. See id. (illustrating that the EEOC responses to mental disability claims contained
in the Guidelines, provides the court with mock scenarios to facilitate their decision
making).
95. See Danforth, supra note 23, at 673.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 675 (identifying serious mentally ill conditions as: bipolar illness, schizo-
phrenia, psychotic disorders and anxiety disorders).
98. See Maggie Jackson, Rulings Called "Horrible Catch-22" for Disabled, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., June 23, 1999, at Al.
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to fear the repercussions of adverse employment decisions based upon
the protections of the ADA. 9
C. Social Aspects of Scaling Back the ADA
Bipolar disorder is treatable almost to the point where the symptoms, if
properly medicated, enter into remission.1 °° There are several drugs and
treatments that allow a bipolar to live an ordinary existence, or as close to
ordinary as possible. 101 As such, employers may hire individuals with the
illness without ever knowing about the condition of their employees. 0 2
In fact, one of the problems associated with protecting bipolar employees
is that many bipolars refuse to disclose their condition.'03 The disclosure
difficulty is predicated on the social stigma attached to the illness. °
Many bipolars choose not to disclose their condition for fear that they
might lose friendships, relationships, and employment. 05 Sutton may
now have the effect of pushing bipolars deeper into the corners of secrecy
by taking away their protective shield against discrimination."0 One
qualification to this note, however, is the fact that any of the debilitating
side effects from medication may still protect the bipolar employee. 7
99. See, e.g., Marschand v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.. 876 F.Supp 1528, 1538 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (deliberating that plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder undisputedly qualifies as a
mental impairment, but it does not satisfy requirement that plaintiff is disabled under the
ADA); see also Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 797 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff is not disabled under the ADA if her claim of depression does not
substantially limit her major life activities).
100. See AYD, supra note 6, at 84 (suggesting that treatments for bipolar disorder are
gaining prominence). As the psychological and genetic sciences advance, so %ill the ame-
liorative aids for bipolar disorder. See id.
101. See MNKLowrrz & GOLDsTEIN, supra note 2, at 132.
102. See Bipolar Patients Interview, supra note 4. Three out of the six people inter-
viewed for this comment are currently employed and have not disclosed the illness to their
employers. See generally A National Suvey of Professionals and Managers with Psychiatric
Conditions, BOSTON UNIVEsrrY RESEARCH CENTER FOR PSYCHIATRIC REtAmLUrAT1ON
(visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.bu.edu/sarpsych/researchsi-3-page2.html> [hereinaf-
ter RESEARCH CENTER] (noting that seventy three percent of four hundred fifty-eight in
the study who reported having psychiatric diagnosis, reported full-time employment).
103. See MIKLowrrz & GOLDSaEIN, supra note 2. at 173 (validating that disclosure of
bipolar illness is different due to the potential social ramifications).
104. See generally JAMISON, supra note 3, at 84 (recalling the tremendous pain and
embarrassment inflicted when bipolars disclose their illness).
105. See generally id. at 124.
106. See Bipolar Patients Interview, supra note 4. All patients responded that they
have a greater fear of disclosing their condition if they were not assured protection against
discrimination. See id. See generally RESEARCH CErTER (noting that 27% of individuals
in the study have regrets about disclosing their condition).
107. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1177-79 (granting that side effects that
substantially limit may enable the claimant to bring a discrimination claim).
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Moreover, if the employer somehow regards the bipolar condition of its
employees as a disability, the employee is ultimately protected.' 08 There-
fore, the employee may invoke his/her right to make a prima facie case of
disability discrimination, with an adverse employment action, based upon
the condition of the employee. 10 9
As it stands now, properly medicated bipolars showing no signs of their
illness may not be covered by the ADA."' The injustice unfolds on two
levels. First, bipolar employees may fall back into mood swings, 111 how-
ever slight, that may affect their capacity to work without reasonable ac-
commodation. Despite the success of medication, stress, diet, and even
weather patterns may effect a functioning bipolar employee.' 12 Secondly,
employers fearing the outcome of hiring or working with an employee
exhibiting a psychological disorder may choose to adversely affect the
employment relationship without "reasonable inquiry into as to whether
the employees condition may be reduced or eliminated by reasonable
accommodation.""13
The essential facet of this analysis returns to the "regarded as" provi-
sion of the ADA. An employer will not regard the employee as having a
disability if the employee shows no signs of his/her illness and refuses to
disclose their condition." 4 However, an employer may adversely affect
employment by covertly acting upon hidden prejudices." 5 If such action
108. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1461 (substantiating the "regarded as" prong of
the disability definition as a saving measure when plaintiffs are unable to prove a substan-
tial limitation).
109. See id. A caveat to this assertion questions whether an employee must still pro-
vide proof of some instance where they were substantially limited in order for the em-
ployer to treat them as disabled. See id. at 1462.
110. The suggestion here is that if the bipolar claimant cannot bring forward sufficient
evidence of a present substantial limitation in any major life activity, their claim will fail as
a matter of law under the Sutton analysis. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
119 S.Ct. 2134 (1999).
111. See MIKLowrrz & GousEIN, supra note 2, at 266 (describing the occurrence of
manic relapses).
112. See TREATMENrs, supra note 5, at 1765 (noting the effects of medication can be
attributed to the patient's conduct). Diet, stress, lack of sleep, or pre-menstrual cycles may
distort the effectiveness of medication. See id. This may cause relapses into mixed hypo-
manic and depressive states. See id.
113. See Danforth, supra note 23, at 691.
114. See Alysa M. Barancik, Comment, Determining Reasonable Accommodations
Under the ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an "Interactive
Process", 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 539 (1999) (suggesting that employers cannot success-
fully gauge the reasonable accommodation for their employees without disclosure of the
impairment).
115. See id. at 519 (qualifying that "plaintiffs often have difficulty providing direct
evidence of discrimination because employers generally avoid making clearly discrimina-
tory statements or policies").
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occurs, an employee with bipolar disorder may not be able to survive the
initial threshold of proving a disability claim."' The fact that the bipolar
employee is medicated and functions normally, thus, shreds away his/her
protected status.
Although the illness is treatable, bipolar disorder is still an incurable
condition that above all-else, carries a social stigma."' The science of
psychological disorders and their treatments are relatively new to the
health industry. The history of treating "seriously mentally ill" conditions
is filled with stories of involuntary commitments to inhumane institutions.
Bipolars cognitive of their condition may no longer have to dread such
treatment. However, those who are ignorant of what bipolar is, typify a
phobia towards people with the disorder. 118 As such, employers with a
phobia have a tendency to discriminate." 9 Presently, if an employer
found out about a healthy employee with bipolar disorder, that employer
could potentially terminate the employee without repercussions.
III. SuTON'S IMPACT ON THE ADA
A. ADA Parameters: Defining What Is Disabled
To fall within the definition of disability as defined under the ADA,
one must have a physical or mental impairment that limits at least one
major life activity (an actual disability), have a record of the disability, or
be regarded as having a disability. 12
116. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.. 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999) (holding that
petitioners must establish a substantial limitation in their major life activity to have stand-
ing for ADA discrimination claim), Marschand v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528,
1538 (D. Ind. 1995) (inferring that if plaintiff cannot show substantial limitation in their
major life activity, their claims fails as a matter of law).
117. See Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (visited Mar. 13, 2000)
<http:llwww.surgeongeneral.govllibrarylmentalhealthlchapterl/secl.html> ihereinafter
Mental Health]. See generally JAMISON supra note 3. at 24 (finding that numerous people
find bipolar sufferers odd and potentially dangerous).
118. See Mark Clements, What We Say About Mental Illness, PARADE MAU., Oct. 31,
1993, at 4-5 (providing results from a survey on views of mental illness). In a poll of 2053
men and women surveyed, 70% said there was a stigma attached to admitting mental ill-
ness and 55% felt the same stigma applied to seeing a mental health professional. See id.
119. See generally Mental Health, supra note 117 (ascribing the public attitudes about
mental illness from the 1950's to the 1990's).
120. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1999) (provid-
ing the criteria which one must show for a case of discrimination due to disability). This
sections states:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having
such impairment.
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Yet beyond the needs of the disabled, is the fear of invidious discrimi-
nation. 121 Although the ADA reduces the ability of an employer to dis-
criminate against the disabled, the statute still permits employers to
prefer some physical attributes over others during the employment pro-
cess. 122 Employers may legally discriminate if there is a business neces-
sity for the tasks of the job. 23 These tasks may take the form of a public
policy issue of safety or a specific requirement to perform the functions of
the job.1 24 Essentially, employers may still legally prohibit some physi-
cally or mentally disabled person from being considered for employment
despite the protections afforded by the ADA if the employee's disability
is determined to pose a direct threat to the safety of others and the risk
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodations. 25
However, just as the ADA is limited in its protective status, employers
are limited in their preferences; employer's preferences for certain physi-
cal attributes shall be reasonable and should not rise to the level of dis-
criminating when the employee can perform the job.'26 Therefore,
preferences must correspond to the requirements of the job.127
The provisions of the ADA suggest that no covered employer shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual with a disability with regards to
121. See 42. U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(1) (1994) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities").
122. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994). The
statute provides for the following affirmative defense to be raised:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend
to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has
been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such per-
formance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under
this subchapter.
Id.
123. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994). Sec-
tion 12113 (a) also permits the denial of employment to individuals with disabilities if it can
be shown to be job related and reasonable accommodation cannot be made that would
allow the individual to fully perform the duties of the job. Id.
124. See generally Danforth, supra note 23, at 689-90 (assessing the "direct threat"
defense as an issue of public policy for employers).
125. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994).
126. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994). Em-
ployers may make bona fide occupational qualifications within the employment such as
height requirements, weight requirements, or vision requirements so long as they are nec-
essary to the essential functions of the job and cannot be accomplished under reasonable
accommodation. See id.; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2150 (1999).
127. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2150. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (asserting the prohibition of discrimination based upon
one's disabling condition).
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the various aspects of employment.'" In its expressed language, covered
entities such as employers, employment agencies, labor or joint labor
management committees with fifty or more employees cannot discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual.129
As the first decade of the ADA comes to a conclusion, the Sutton deci-
sion attempts to end the debate on whether mitigating factors should be
taken into consideration when constituting an impairment as a disabil-
ity.130 The Supreme Court's initial concerns when deciding this case in-
cluded the Congressional intent for the ADA legislation.' The ADA
prohibits discrimination against individuals on the basis of their disabili-
ties.'32 In order to be covered under the ADA, one must prove that they
have an impairment that "substantially limits" one or more of their major
life activities.133 As such, the focus in litigation shifts from the conduct of
the employer to the status of the employee." - When Sutton limits the
ability for plaintiffs to apply for such status, the ADA itself is limited.' 35
B. Legislative Intent
The ADA's legislative history explains the issue of mitigating factors
through both implicated language and expressed language." The legis-
lative history specifically supports making disability determinations with-
out regard to the effect of mitigating measures in a Senate debate on the
issue.1 3 7 The Senate Committee Report states "whether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigat-
ing measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."'I
128. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
129. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2). (5)(a) (1994).
A qualified individual with a disability is identified as "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position that such individual holds or desires."
130. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2142 (recognizing that the Sutton decision would end the
circuit split on the mitigating factors issue).
131. See id. at 2148-49.
132. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (stating
prohibition of discrimination based on disabling conditions).
133. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2202, 2209 (1996) (establishing the
threshold for proving discrimination claims).
134. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1426-27.
135. See id. at 1472-73 (assessing that changes need to be made in the ADA to prevent
the statute's language from undermining its intent). The suggestion here is to refocus the
emphasis of ADA litigation toward the employer's discrimination. See ad.
136. See S. REP. No. 101-116. at 23 (1989) (providing the legislative debates on the
issue of mitigating measures read into the ADA).
137. See id. at 23-24 (explaining whether mitigating factors should be accounted for
when defining a disability).
138. Id. at 23.
20001
THE SCHOLAR
Further, the House Labor Committee explained that a person who is
hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major life activity of hear-
ing, even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing
aid. 13 9 These specific statements express an implicit intent for courts to
make disability determinations without regard to mitigating measures. 140
Congress also intended the ADA to cover a broad range of citizens
with a wide range of disabilities.' 4 ' According to one commentator, "'re-
medial statutes' [of this nature] are generally entitled to a broad interpre-
tation focused on achieving the goals of the statute."14 The ADA not
only sought to provide coverage in a broad range of areas, but also to a
large number of individuals. 143 This language was taken directly from the
language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.14'
In several respects, the ADA was written to broaden the intent of the
Rehabilitation Act that provided limited coverage to the disabled work-
ing in the public sector or with private industries contracting under fed-
eral subsidies. 145 The protection against discriminatory conduct within
the ADA is purported to expand the ideology of the Rehabilitation
Act. 14 6 Even when critics of the ADA called for an enumerated list of
covered disabilities to provide clarity, the House of Representatives re-
fused to provide such a list because it would have been impossible to
ensure the "comprehensiveness of the ADA.' ' 147 Legislators also refused
to provide this list in light of the fact that new disorders may develop in
139. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, available in 1990 WL 121680 (1990).
140. See generally S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (providing that medications
should not affect the underlying presence of one's disabling condition); H.R. REP. No. 101-
485, pt. III, available in 1990 WL 121680 (1990).
141. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that consistent with the Congressional intent for the ADA as a remedial statute, "individ-
ual with a disability" should be interpreted broadly).
142. Isaac S. Greaney, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of Mitigat-
ing Measures under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 FORD1AM U". L.J.
1267, 1273 (1999); see Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV.
L. REv. 1568 (1996) (postulating that a remedial statute deserves broad interpretation).
143. See generally S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989) (noting that the ADA's intent was
to "end discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
144. See Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1994).
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-
sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society...
Id.
145. See id.
146. See Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
147. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, available in 1990 WL 121680 (1990)
(arguing that a comprehensive list of disabilities would be more exclusive than inclusive
due to the fact that new conditions may be discovered every period).
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the future.148 These arguments from Congress could therefore be con-
strued to support the broad interpretive coverage of the ADA. 49
The legislative history also calls for a practical approach on a case by
case basis when making these disability determinations." 0 Here, a scien-
tific or hypothetical approach gives way to a functional analysis of one's
disability.15' Representative Steve Bartlett, ADA House Bill manager,
stated that "the ADA does not cover nine hundred classes of disability
... Instead, the ADA includes a functional approach rather than a medi-
cal definition of disability."' 2
The functional approach is a broader technique that allows the presid-
ing court to hear the evidence on a disability claim and rely on the court's
discretion.' 53 The functional approach is in opposition to a more formu-
lized approach that, in effect, enumerates the disabilities that shall or
shall not be covered." 5 This may provide the reason why Congress re-
fused to provide a list of enumerated disabilities.
However, court decisions such as Washington v. HCA followed the
House Reports for the following reasons: the court decisions were di-
rectly on point; came after the Senate Report; and were incorporated by
the Senate Bill that was passed and signed by the President. 55 Conse-
quently, the Washington court, upon remand and wary of contradicting
legislative intent, evaluated the plaintiffs condition in its unmitigated
state.156 Yet, the Washington court limited its ruling by stating that miti-
gating measures should still be taken into account for less serious
impairments.
157
148. See generally id.
149. See Greaney, supra note 142, at 1274 (asserting that the broad approach has
mainly been used by courts in support of the EEOC's interpretive guidance).
150. See id. at 1275.
151. See id. at 1273 (suggesting that one's disability should be functionally analyzed
rather than hypothetically analyzed).
152. See 136 CONG. R-c 9072 (daily ed. May 1, 1990) (quoting Steve Bartlett in refer-
ring to the functional utilization of the ADA).
153. See Greaney, supra note 142, at 1273 (defining the focus on how courts should
determine whether employees are disabled for purposes of the ADA).
154. See id. The rationale for enumerating each disabling condition is such that the
legislature would be inundated with medical testimony as to what qualifies as a substan-
tially limiting impairment. See id.
155. See 48 CONG. WKL-Y. REP. Q. 2227 (1990) (evaluating that the incorporation of
the Senate report by the House legitimized the intent of Congress to disregard mitigating
measures).
156. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that the House report is unambiguous and incorporates a reference from
the Senate report that does not allow a court to look at mitigating measures unless the
"amount to permanent corrections or ameliorations").
157. Id. at 471.
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The Congressional findings attached to the ADA supported the explicit
qualification that the statute would cover approximately forty-three mil-
lion Americans.158 For many jurisdictions deciding on disability issues,
the fear is that the umbrella of the ADA is too expansive in its explicit
form.159 However, Justice O'Connor noted in Sutton that the number
grows from forty-three million to one-hundred-sixty million if the EEOC
guidelines were adhered to.' 60
Logic may dictate that it was not the intent of Congress to protect one-
hundred-sixty million people where the clear majority of those people
have minor or permanently correctable conditions. For example, it would
be difficult to compare a broken arm or someone with correctable vision
to someone suffering from cancer or diabetes. The penultimate issue,
therefore, centers upon whether the numbers utilized by Congress should
be read broadly or adhered to specifically.
C. EEOC Guidelines
Congress authorized the EEOC to create regulations for enforcement
of the ADA and to provide interpretive guidelines. 6' The administrative
guidelines defined the terms absent from the statutory text.162 Thus, the
EEOC constructed its interpretive guidelines by defining crucial terms
such as "mental and physical impairment," "substantially limiting," and
"major life activities". 63 The guidelines direct the courts to approach the
disability inquiry by comparing an individual's ability to perform a spe-
cific activity with members of the general population.'" The EEOC reg-
ulations also instruct the courts to specifically adhere to an individualized
inquiry into the plaintiff's impairment. 65
158. See Burgdorf, supra note 41, at 434 n.117.
159. See Michel Lee, Searching for Patterns and Anomalies in the ADA Employment
Constellation: Who Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability and What Accommodations
Are Courts Really Demanding?, 13 THE LAB. LAW. 149, 149-51 (1997).
160. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2147-48 (1999). In Sutton, Justice
O'Connor discusses that the estimated number of disabled Americans stretches to an over-
inclusive one hundred sixty million under a health conditions approach which looks at all
conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual. Id. at
2148.
161. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.
162. See Greaney, supra note 142, at 1274.
163. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(1), (2)(i), (j) (1999); Greaney, supra note 142, at 1274.
164. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1999). "The term substantially limits
means: (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform." Id.
165. See id. (noting that in paragraph eight determining whether one is substantially
limited requires a case by case basis).
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Although the original regulations did not discuss the effects of mitigat-
ing measures, the interpretive guidelines, attached as an appendix to the
regulations, clarify its provisions and respond to the courts' need to de-
fine whether mitigating circumstances should be considered."( Specifi-
cally, these guidelines expressly state that whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity should be made on a case by case
basis, without regard to mitigating measures."6 7
Despite the fact that Congress mandated the EEOC to create regula-
tions pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the interpretive
guidelines are not promulgated under Congressional direction.'68 Thus,
some courts prior to Sutton agreed that the EEOC's interpretive guide-
lines were less binding than the mandated regulations and thereby de-
served less judicial deference, particularly when in conflict with the
statutory language. 6 9 Such decisions suggest support to discount mitigat-
ing measures utilized by ADA claimants and have provided the Supreme
Court with a justified basis for not adhering to Congressional intent.
Prior to the Sutton decision, the lower courts were split among the cir-
cuits that adopted the EEOC's approach of ignoring mitigating circum-
stances when determining whether the claimant was disabled and the
circuits that took mitigating circumstances into consideration.17 The
166. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1999) (denoting definitions for use in implementa-
tion of the ADA) with 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1999) (stating the need for the disability
analysis to be made without regard to mitigating measures).
167. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1999). "The existence of an impairment is to be
determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or pros-
thetic devices." Id.
168. See Greaney, supra note 142. at 1275 (acknowledging that courts have disagreed
on the level of deference because of conflict in guidelines and regulations).
169. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), cert granted
(holding that EEOC interpretive guidelines conflict with the intent of the ADA); Hodgens
v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F.Supp. 102 (D.R.I. 1997) (reasoning that the EEOC in-
terpretations are not entitled to the same amount of deference ordinarily accorded to its
promulgated regulations); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1437. 1445 (DWis.
1996) (concluding that EEOC guidelines are "at odds" with the ADA and therefore do not
deserve judicial deference). See generally James G. Frierson, Heads You Lose, Tails You
Lose: A Disturbing Judicial Trend in Defining Disability. 48 Lu. LJ. 419.425 (1997) (not-
ing the absence of express Congressional direction with regard to the creation of the
EEOC's interpretive guidelines); Greaney. supra note 142, at 1281.
170. Compare Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F-3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) affd, 119
S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures should be viewed when assessing
whether ADA plaintiffs are substantially limited) and Holihan v. Lucky Stores. 87 F.3d
362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that mitigating factors should be viewed when defining
whether one has a disability), with Washington v. HCA Healthcare Services, 152 F-1d 464
(5th Cir. 1998) (stating that in determining whether mitigating factors should be consid-
ered, a case by case analysis should be conducted), with Matczak v. Frankford Candy and
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that mitigating factors should
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EEOC's guidelines suggest that an individual's condition should be evalu-
ated in its uncorrected or unmitigated form.' 71 The guidelines essentially
focus on what is a "substantial limitation" to a major life activity.17 2
Thus, it is the EEOC's interpretation that 'substantially limited' can and
should be determined regardless of mitigating measures. 173 The majority
of courts on this issue were persuaded that the EEOC guidelines were
correct in ignoring an individual's condition in its mitigated state. 174 Sut-
ton, however, contradicts this majority and the interpretation of the
EEOC.17
5
No agency or regulation has specifically defined disability for the courts
to utilize under the ADA. The EEOC, however, provides guidance in its
regulations of what should be seen as a "substantially limiting" condition
in order to demonstrate what qualifies as a disability.' 76
not be considered when defining disabilities), and Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,
627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the mitigating factors should not be considered when
defining what is disabled for purposes of the ADA). But see Gilday v. Mecosta County,
124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (providing that no deference
should be given to the EEOC guidelines when defining what is "substantially limited" for
purposes of the ADA).
171. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (h) (1997).
The term "substantially limits" means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to per-
form a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of working.
Id.
172. See C.F.R. 1630.20)(3)(1) (1997).
173. See C.F.R. 1630 (1997); see also Greaney, supra note 142, at 1276-79 (addressing
how the EEOC interprets the substantially limiting determination without regard to miti-
gating measures).
174. Compare Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) affd, 119
S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (holding mitigating measures should be viewed when assessing whether
ADA plaintiffs are substaintially limited), with Washington, 152 F.3d at 464 (stating that
mitigating factors should be considered when reviewing less than severe impairments), and
Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937 (suggesting that mitigating factors should not be considered when
defining disabilities), with Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366 (agreeing with the EEOC assessment
that mitigating factors should not be considered when defining disabilities), and Doane,
115 F.3d at 627 (holding that the mitigating factors should not be considered when defining
what is disabled for purposes of the ADA). But see Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766-77 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (promoting no deference should be given to the EEOC guidelines when
defining what is "substantially limited" for purposes of the ADA).
175. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999).
176. See C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1999) (according to the EEOC, substantially limiting life
activities include any element which limits one's ability to breathe, see, hear, walk, or take
care of themselves).
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The Supreme Court has adhered to the EEOC regulations that have
defined impairments as any psychological or physiological disorder which
"substantially limits" major life activities.
The Supreme Court did not raise the issue of whether the interpretive
guidelines deserve deference.'" However, the deference issue was made
moot by the Court when it affirmed the 10th Circuit's stance that the
guidelines were in conflict with the ADA.17 8 As such, the opinion did not
follow the regulations of the EEOC and Justice Department providing
that the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited
must be made without regard to mitigating measures. 179 Therefore, the
Sutton decision marks a change in the way courts will view disabilities."8
By narrowing the scope of the disability definition, the Supreme Court
has undercut the power of the ADA and the power of the agency that
oversees its regulation.''
IV. PROVING UP THE DISABILITY
A. Threshold Analysis
Discrimination in the context of the ADA involves several nuances. In
a similar vein to Title VII,"an the ADA prohibits discrimination during
the application process, within the job itself, within the aspects of reten-
tion, advancement, promotion, or training, and within the aspects of any
adverse employment action.' 83 Employees must not only show that they
are qualified individuals with a disability, they must also show how notice
was provided to the employer concerning the disability and how reason-
able accommodations were requested by the employee.'8 The "regarded
as" provision in the ADA provides further protection from employers
177. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.
178. See id.
179. See id. (holding that persons who are to be evaluated in their hypothetical uncor-
rected state is an impermissable interpretation of the ADA).
180. See Washington v. HCA Healthcare Servs., 152 F3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1998);
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. !997); Holihan
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 862, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997).
181. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999) (deciding that
the EEOC guidelines are an impermissible expansion of the ADA statute).
182. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against
the five protected classes). The five protected classes include race, sex, color, religion, and
national origin. See id.
183. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994); see also
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (providing aspects of protection for employees
against discrimination).
184. See Danforth, supra note 23, at 668-70 (assessing that employees must disclose
their conditions before requesting reasonable accommodations).
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who seek to discriminate based upon the condition of the employee. 18 5
Therefore, even if an employee does not freely disclose their disability,
employers may not adversely affect an individual's terms of employment
upon recognition of the employee's disability.' 8 6
An employee may create a prima facie case for discrimination based
upon the analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.187 Under Mc-
Donnell Douglas, the employee must first show that he is a member of
the protected class of disabled individuals and must then show that the
employer took an adverse employment action by replacing the employee
or continuing to hold the position open although the individual was quali-
fied.'" The employer is then free to rebut the presumption of discrimi-
natory conduct with a legitimate explanation for their employment
decision.'" 9 However, the employee may then show that the non-discrim-
inatory explanation given for the employment decision is a pre-textual
decision. 190
This analysis taken from McDonnell Douglas exemplifies how proving
up the discriminatory case in Title VII is analogous to disability discrimi-
nation. 191 The technical aspects of proving up both sides of discrimina-
tion are similar; the qualifications of Title VII are clearly enumerated,
185. See Harris, supra note 59, at 590-91 (suggesting that the "regarded as" provision
within the ADA provides an additional protection for employees). The "regarded as" pro-
vision allows the employer to simply view the employee as disabled thus granting the em-
ployee a reasonable expectation of protection and accommodation. See id.
186. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-86 & n.13 (1987)
(discussing the purpose of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994));
Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that em-
ployers may not utilize adverse employment action based upon their belief that the em-
ployee has a disabling condition).
187. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). Most circuits have
applied the analysis of McDonnell Douglas when the employer denies discriminatory con-
duct for their employment decision and there is no direct evidence of discrimination. See
Harris, supra note 59, at 587 & n.44 (listing several cases from six circuits that have applied
the McDonell Douglas analysis).
188. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (providing the factors
that must be established in order to meet a prima facie case of discrimination).
189. See id.; see also Harris, supra note 59, at 587-89 (noting the eligibility factors for a
prima facie case of discrimination for ADA claimants under the McDonnell Douglas
concept).
190. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 (holding that an individual must
be given the opportunity to show that employer's explanation to the court is in fact pre-
text); see also Harris, supra note 59, at 587-89 (analyzing the burden shifting analysis for
ADA claimants under the McDonnell Douglas concept).
191. See Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that "[a]bsent direct evidence of discrimination, [plaintiff] must satisfy three-step proof
scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green... to prevail on his ADA and
ADEA claims" (citation omitted)).
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while what qualifies as a disability remains contentious at best."9 The
extra step in proving that one has a disability before going into the Mc-
Donnell Douglas analysis creates a substantial roadblock for plaintiffs
seeking protection. In reality, the promises of the ADA to integrate the
disabled into mainstream society is constantly met with judicial road-
blocks as courts narrow the interpretation of the statute.1 93 Decreasing
the scope of redress in which a plaintiff may seek protection for his/her
disability has a significant impact in the interests of justice.1"
With the ADA, a plaintiff faces more obstacles compared to Title VII
when proving that they are a member of a protected class.19 5 At times,
the class membership issue, or determination of whether one has a disa-
bility, may be the most important issue in dispute.196 Because the defini-
tion of disability is not as clear as those of Title VII protected classes,
plaintiffs claiming discrimination under the ADA may be unable to access
the services necessary to assess their condition in order to meet their bur-
den of proof. 97 As such, plaintiffs usually face a daunting task in sur-
mounting this extra barrier in the burden of proof allocation. 98 Further,
in more complex cases where the discriminatory conduct is at issue, an
ADA plaintiff cannot satisfy their burden of proof by merely showing
there was discriminatory conduct.' In addition to showing that employ-
ers engaged in such conduct, the ADA plaintiff would also have to pro-
vide proof of their membership in a "protected class". °
192. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1424 (imploring that ADA claimants have an
additional barrier to prove their cases as compared to Title VII cases).
193. See Lanctot, supra note 70, at 328 (asserting that the "failure of the ADA to
provide comprehensive protection against discrimination can be attributed to judicial nar-
rowing of its provisions").
194. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1173 (asserting that a beneficial out-
come of Sutton will only occur if lower courts maintain the "breadth of disabling correc-
tions" and "ensure that meritous claims are not improperly rejected at summary judgment
stage").
195. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1424-25.
196. See Lee, supra note 159, at 153 (assessing that a disability determination is for
discrimination claims is the "crucial threshold question of most ADA cases").
197. See id. Eichhom, supra note 44, at 1424 (stating that the burden to show they
indeed have a disability resides with the claimant; thus, claimants must bear the cost to
prove up their disability); Mastroianni & Miaskoff, supra note 30, at 728 (asserting that
individuals who cannot afford mental health assessment or other types of medical docu-
mentation should not be excluded from ADA coverage).
198. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1424-25 (indicating that before pursuing a dis-
crimination claim, the ADA requires a plaintiff to prove they are a "qualified individual
with a disability"); Mastroianni & Miaskoff, supra note 30, at 728.
199. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1424-25 (suggesting that plaintiffs have additional
burdens of proof in their ADA discrimination claims compared to Title VII claims).
200. Id. (establishing that the ADA wrongly focuses on whether claimants can provide
proof that they belong within a "protected class").
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B. Sutton's Treatment of the "Actual Disability" Prong
Justice O'Connor's opinion specifically states that a 'disability' exists
only where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity, not
where it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting" absent miti-
gating measures.2 0 ' Her logic stems from an interpretation of the lan-
guage in the ADA itself, which she concludes should be read in a present
indicative form.2' Therefore, according to Justice O'Connor, "substan-
tially limits" means, to be presently substantially limited.2 °3
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the ADA in its present indicative
form correlates with the decision in circuits that have ignored the EEOC
guidelines in both majority and dissenting opinions. 2 4 Examples include
Justice Kennedy's concurring and dissenting opinion in the Sixth Circuit
case of Gilday v. Mecosta County.20 5 Justice Kennedy suggested that mit-
igating factors should be considered when reviewing whether an individ-
ual is disabled. 06 Justice Kennedy observed, contrary to the opinion of
the majority, that although Gilday's medication stabilized his condition,
he would be "substantially limit[ed] ... in the major life activity of work-
ing.",20 7 It was his opinion, therefore, that Gilday appears to be disabled
for purposes of ADA protection.208 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in
Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., agreed with the Sixth
Circuit majority in Gilday.209 In Washington, the court reasoned that a
disability must be assessed without regard to mitigating measures due to
an apprehension of overruling the EEOC interpretation and Congres-
sional intent.2 l0 However, applying a narrow interpretation of the EEOC
201. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999).
202. See id.
203. See id. (opining that the statute should be interpreted in its present indicative
form, and thus when discerning one's condition it must be viewed in its present form).
204. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997); Gilday v.
Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997).
205. See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that it was not necessary to consult the EEOC guidelines because the
statute is unambiguous).
206. See id. (proposing that the remission of the claimants condition no longer makes
him disabled).
207. Id. at 767-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. See id.
209. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 469-70 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that the EEOC guidelines deserve some deference when determining
whether a disability exists under mitigating measures utilized by the claimant because the
statute is ambiguous). The court stated that the court does not defer to the EEOC's guide-
lines only when the language of the ADA is unambiguous. See id.
210. Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
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guidelines, the court held that such review should not be provided to
claimants with less severe impairments.211
The appellate court opinions of Sutton, Gilday and Washington present
the issue of whether a court should give the EEOC deference when de-
termining what should be considered as a disabling condition under the
ADA.212 The deference issue is key due to the fact that the EEOC' s
guidelines purport to not look at mitigating measures utilized by the
plaintiff.213 The majority of courts have decided to support the EEOC
guidelines and give them deference.21 4 The Gilday decision, however,
provides dicta proposing that the guidelines were in direct conflict with
the statute.21 5
Above all else, the Sutton decision now directs the lower courts to at all
times illicit the employee's condition in its present state.21 6 Therefore, if
a plaintiff is currently healthy, an inquiry as to one's condition when
viewed in its present form will always be viewed in a healthy/non-disabled
form if there are no manifestations of their condition.2 17 Inexplicably,
despite the majority circuit court opinions, the Supreme Court, in one fell
swoop, has gutted the ADA and segregated employees from those with
211. See id. (noting that mitigating measures should be utilized by the court when
revealing less severe impairments but not when the impairment is more severe). The
court's reasoning held that although taking mitigating measures seemed unreasonable
under less severe circumstances, one could not ignore the administrative guidelines pro-
vided by the EEOC. See id.
212. Compare Washington, 152 F.3d at 471 (stating that mitigating factors should be
considered when defining disabilities with less severity), and Matezak v. Frankford Candy
and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that mitigating factors
should not be considered when defining less severe disabilities), with Holihan v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that mitigating factors should not be
considered when defining disabilities), and Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,627 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the mitigating factors should not be considered when defining what
is disabled for purposes of the ADA). But see Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,767
(6th Cir. 1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing that no
deference should be given to the EEOC guidelines when defining what is -substantially
limited" for purposes of the ADA).
213. See 29 C.F.R. § app. 1630.2(j) (1999).
214. See Washington, 152 F.3d at 471 (holding that the EEOC guidelines are not in
conflict with the ADA); Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937-38 (finding that the EEOC guidelines
deserve some judicial deference); Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366; Doane, 115 F.3d at 627.
215. See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (providing that the EEOC
guidelines directly conflict with the ADA).
216. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999).
217. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1171 (postulating that the Supreme
Court has observed "substantially limiting" should be utilized in a present indicative form
in order to demonstrate disability).
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visible conditions and those with less perceivable conditions.2 18 Employ-
ees who are clearly handicapped with physical impairments such as
paraplegics, the blind, or the hearing impaired will still fall under the um-
brella of the ADA.219 However, the employees whose conditions are less
obvious, such as employees with bipolar disorder, stand outside the pro-
tection of the ADA.22 °
C. Sutton's Treatment of the "Record Of" Prong
Claimants alleging there is a record of their disability have greater lee-
way when bringing a disability claim. However, allegations under the
"record of' a disability prong is the least likely candidate for ADA
claims.22' In fact, the record of prong was not treated in Sutton. Yet, by
implication, this second prong of the three prong test must still rely on
the interpretation of whether the claimant has a "substantial limitation"
in a "major life activity., 222 The substantial limitation comes in to play
whereby in the immediate past, the claimant had a recorded impairment
sufficient to bring an ADA claim.2 With this implication in mind, Sut-
ton could potentially detract from the recordation of an impairment by
determining the mitigated state in the past precluded standing for a disa-
bility claim in the present. 4
D. Sutton's Treatment of the "Regarded As" Prong
Justice O'Connor, in Sutton's parallel decision of Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc. ,225 suggests that those with continuing disabling condi-
tions will still be covered because the key to enabling a discrimination
claim is looking at the substantial limitations of the employee or the con-
218. See Lynette Clemetson, A Sharper Image of Bias: Three Major Disability Deci-
sions Put Stricter Limits on Who Can Sue Employers for Discrimination in Hiring, NEws-
WEEK, July 5, 1999, at 27 (quoting Georgetown University Law Center professor, Chai
Feldblum).
219. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1170-71 (indicating that the majority in
Sutton conceived that not all corrected impairments were precluded from ADA coverage).
220. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1430 (asserting that individuals with conditions
that are less severe are deemed suspect even though they are discriminated against because
of that impairment).
221. See id. at 1461.
222. See id.
223. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1998) (noting that a "record of such impairment"
means a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities).
224. See generally Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1461 (suggesting that if the substantial
limitation hurdle is not met in the record of prong, claimants are disqualified from claiming
disabled status).
225. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999).
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duct of the employer." 6 Employees with AIDS or cancer will continue
to work under the protections of the ADA as long as their impairments
substantially limit their abilities. 7 These types of disabling conditions
may therefore be "regarded as" disabling if the employer chooses to re-
gard the employee as disabled.'
However, there is an assumption from the Supreme Court that the re-
garded as prong is realistically affective in identifying employer conduct;
and, as a result of their conduct, employer's will identify the employee as
disabled.2 9
The unfortunate truth is the "regarded as" prong of the disability defi-
nition places the plaintiff in no better position than a plaintiff who must
prove up their disability.' 3 Medicated employees with conditions such as
cancer or AIDS may find their conditions falling into remission. At that
point, under Sutton, an employer or presiding court may potentially no
longer consider that employee as disabled." As such, Sutton leaves the
door open for courts to trump the conduct of employer by only looking at
the condition of the employee. 3 2
For example, if an employer regarded their employee as a cancer risk,
and that cancer went into remission due to mitigating treatments, the em-
ployer would then be free to adversely affect the employee's terms of
employment due to the fact that they are no longer considered disabled.
226. Murphy, 119 S.Ct. at 2137 (deliberating whether a claimant may be protected by
the ADA if they can show evidence of a substantial limitation of a major life activity). See
also Mastroianni & Miaskoff, supra note 30, at 737 (validating that perceived impairments
by the employer regarding a disability will be covered under the -regarded as" prong of
the ADA).
227. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999) (stating that the
use of a corrective device does not relieve one's disability if that individual is still substan-
tially limited in a major life activity).
228. See American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (1994) (de-
noting the third prong defining disability): see also Mastroianni & Miaskoff. supra note 30,
at 739. The "regarded as" prong is intended to guard against employers that take adverse
action against employees with no impairment, but who are perceived as having a disabling
condition. See Mastroianni & Miaskoff, supra note 30, at 739.
229. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149-50.
230. See James M. Zappa, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Improv-
ing Judicial Determinations of Whether an Individual is "Substantially Limited", 75 MINN.
L. REv. 1303, 1330-31 (1991).
231. See Honberg, supra note 28.
232. See Ellis v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
plaintiff's ability to work precluded her record of a disability claim).
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The argument against this assertion relies on the "regarded as" prong
of the ADA.233 Proponents of viewing conditions in their unmitigated
state argue that an employer will become subject to scrutiny if its adverse
employment actions are due to some form of prejudice towards a per-
ceived disability. 34 Yet, the reality is, employees have an almost impossi-
ble task of proving discriminatory conduct towards perceived disabilities
short of direct proof. 35 Moreover, an employee that appears healthy will
have difficulty bringing a claim if they are not presently "substantially
limited" according to Sutton.2 3 6
V. BALANCING TENSIONS
In a litigious society, arguably, the dangers of frivolous suits and abuse
of the legal system already exists. With this in mind, there is logic behind
the Supreme Court's decision to limit the ADA protective umbrella.237
In hindsight however, the issue of justice must enter into the debate of
whether scaling back these protections creates greater social utility. In its
efforts to curtail the expansion of the ADA, the Supreme Court has
chopped off a segment of society truly deserving of protection. In point
of fact, millions of Americans will be unjustly ignored from the protec-
tions of the ADA through the expressed language of the Sutton
decision. 38
As the first decade of the ADA comes to a conclusion, the Sutton deci-
sion attempts to end the debate on whether mitigating factors should be
taken into consideration when constituting an impairment as a disabil-
ity. 3 9 Coverage under the ADA extends only to those who can prove
that they have an impairment that "substantially limits" one or more ma-
233. See Peter R. Marksteiner, Supreme Court Limits Coverage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 74 FLA. B.J. 32, 38 (2000) (granting that the "regarded as" door is still
"wide open" for ADA claimants).
234. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n Compliance Manual § 902.8(a)
(EEOC Order 915.002, Mar. 14, 1995) (stating that the "regarded as" provision applies to
individuals subjected to discrimination based on information relating to illness, disease or
other types of disorders); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (1999).
235. The argument here is that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis has
been applied to the ADA because direct proof of discrimination is hard to come by. Yet,
despite the application of the McDonnell Douglas test, the overwhelming majority of
claims still fail during the summary judgment stage. See generally Harris, supra note 59, at
590-91.
236. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1170-71.
237. See Harris, supra note 59, at 582-83 (alluding to the unnecessary expansiveness of
the ADA through the EEOC's no mitigation guideline).
238. See Clemetson, supra note 218 (quoting Georgetown University Law Center pro-
fessor, Chai Feldblum as that "[t]he ruling cuts the heart out of the ADA").
239. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999).
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jor life activity. Therefore, the focus in litigation shifts from the conduct
of the employer to the status of the employee.240 When Sutton limits the
ability for plaintiffs to apply for such status, the ADA itself is limited.2 4'
The fallout from the language of Sutton is only slightly apparent. 242
However, the news is not good for employers when one considers the
lower court opinions reading Sutton as a limitation on judicial redress.2 43
Some commentators have noted that firms dropping clients due to the
Sutton opinion may be premature in their assessment of their cases."'
However, interpreting the ADA in its present indicative form creates the
danger of allowing an employer to reassess the condition of its employ-
ees, and allows an opening for these employers to freely discriminate."' 5
Arguably therefore, Sutton has limited access to the courts through the
ADA.24
As with many other issues, the Supreme Court is concerned with judi-
cial economy and must balance legitimate claims with those that do not
comport to the standards of the ADA's original intent.2 47 By the same
240. See Eichhorn, supra note 44, at 1472-73 (assessing that changes need to be made
towards the focus of the ADA to prevent the statute's language from undermining its in-
tent). The suggestion here is to refocus the emphasis of ADA litigation toward the em-
ployer's conduct and away from the protected status assessment of the employee.
241. See generally Burgdorf, supra note 41, at 437-38.
242. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1170-71.
243. See 23 Mental Health & Physical Disability L Rep. 841, November/December
1999 citing Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
Mental Health Disability] (noting the Third Circuit's vacated prior opinion of a teacher
suffering from bipolar disorder). The Third Circuit originally reversed a federal court's
grant of summary judgment finding that the plaintiff, in her unmedicated condition,
demonstrated that she had a disability. See id. The court vacated this opinion after the
announcement of Sutton and remanded inquiries of general factual disputes. See id. See
generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1173 n.74 (allucidating that there is already a strong
trend for lower interpreting the use of mitigating measures to limit the "applicability" of
the ADA).
244. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1170-71.
245. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2152-54 (1999) (Stevens, J..
dissenting) (suggesting that the majority opinion's application of "substantially limited"
diminishes the ADA's three pronged definition of disability). See generally McGarity,
supra note 82, at 1161 & n.1 (citing Maggie Jackson, Rulings Called "Horrible Catch 22"for
Disabled, Amt. CONST., June 23, 1999, at Al and underscoring an attorney's experience
from an article that the legal community will drop ADA cases due to the Sutton decisions).
246. See Marksteiner, supra note 233, at 32-33 (suggesting that the legal decisions of
mid-July, 1999, concerning the ADA have limited the protections afforded by the statute).
247. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149 (noting that Congress utilized the bright line of 43
million to establish discrimination coverage).
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token, the concern for judicial economy must not sacrifice the interests of
justice.248 At a minimum, Sutton creates an imbalance of these interests.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Despite the legitimate concerns of limiting ADA coverage due to frivo-
lous suits, the principles of justice should prevail. At the very core of this
analysis, it should be understood that the intent of the ADA was to pro-
vide broad coverage to disabled employees. The directive from Congress
is unambiguous on this point, and the interests of justice require such
broad application.
Indeed, a more practical approach is needed when determining
whether an employee should be protected under the ADA.24 9 In order to
attain this practical approach, one may refer to the letter of the statute
itself and its original intent. Imbedded within the ADA and the regula-
tions of the EEOC is a functional approach to decide what should be
considered a disability." 0 This functional basis allows courts to look at
the severity of the illness on an individual inquiry."' Moreover, the se-
verity of the illness should be applied from both its present state and its
potential state. This means looking at an impairment without regard to
mitigating factors depending on the severity of the condition. In all fair-
ness, the potential state of an illness is not a hypothetical state. For those
that suffer from bipolar disorder, the potential for certain relapses is very
real.252
Congress should review the Sutton decision and amend the ADA to
consider disabilities as they exist without regard to mitigating measures
based on the severity of the illness.
Another consideration, especially for bipolars, is the potential side ef-
fect of taking these mitigating measures. The side effects of bipolar medi-
cations may take a debilitating toll as severe as the illness itselfL1 3 If,
however, an individual chooses not to use certain treatments because of
the potential for side effects, it will be difficult for a court to determine
whether the impairment in reality is truly mitigated. In any case, a pre-
248. See McGarity, supra note 82, at 1197 (concluding that the sweeping deleterious
affects of the Sutton decision can be avoided if lower courts and EEOC espouse to the
original intent of the ADA).
249. See Greaney, supra note 142, at 1285-86 (asserting that a practical approach of
viewing disabilities is to look at the severity of the illness without regard to mitigating
measures).
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
251. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at 1172.
252. See generally id. at 1177-81.
253. See JAMISON, supra note 3, at 137-75. See generally McGarity, supra note 82, at
1176-77 (referring to the debilitating side effects of disabling conditions).
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siding court should not take the position of mandating treatments to peo-
ple with mental illness. In other words, the Sutton decision also marks an
opening for courts to determine that if a cure for the impairment is rea-
sonably available to the employee, that employee is not disabled. This
type of judicial posturing is wrong and unethical.
An answer to this scenario would appear to be that if the side effects
rise to the level of an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity, then the individual is still covered. In the case of bipolar disor-
der, the answer, unfortunately is not that simple. Many bipolars choose
not to take medications due to their dehumanizing side effects. At the
other end of the spectrum, bipolar patients desire to live a normal func-
tioning life. Thus, medication and other such remedial or mitigating tools
are necessary. The duality of living with bipolar illness is compounded
even further when one considers the prejudice from employers that do
not understand the condition.
Considering mitigating measures will compel courts to determine what
risks are acceptable and what risks are not reasonably acceptable. Conse-
quently, such a consideration requires delving into the flux of physiologi-
cal and psychological diagnosis and effective treatments. As a result,
judges render inconsistent decisions in cases involving certain medicated
impairments.
On the other hand, the bright line rule approach, only serves the pur-
pose of discharging individual inquiry. By this measure, the fear of classi-
fying disabilities into specific groups once again surfaces. Therefore, it
seems that the easiest way to allocate fairness while looking at the side
effects issue is to examine both the personal history of the claimant and
the potential realities of a relapse.
From the outset of this comment, there have been glaring examples of
how taking mitigating measures into account for an individual's disability
is intrinsically unfair. The corollary, though, is that forcing claimants to
take mitigating measures is too intrinsically unfair. And for many, the
costs may be too high both emotionally and financially.
There is little question that the Supreme Court has potentially gone too
far in scaling back the protections of the ADA. By using bipolar disorder
as one of many impairments affected by the Sutton decision, this com-
ment exemplifies how the ADA is more than just a umbrella for those
seeking protection against the discriminatory conduct of employers. It is
also a shield against those who would act upon their social prejudices and
ignorance.
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